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On September 8, 2003, something unthinkable happened:

the

recording industry began suing its own customers. Over the succeeding
five years, the recording industry would threaten to sue or sue more than
30,000 of its customers for sharing music through peer-to-peer (P2P) file
*
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sharing networks. Faced with the prospect of financially ruinous
litigation, the vast majority of those threatened settled, usually for a
payment in the range of $2,000 to $15,000 and a promise not to do it
again. Two of the lawsuits have resulted in jury verdicts, both against the
file sharers.' In the first, on retrial, a jury found Jammie Thomas-Rasset
liable for $1.92 million for infringing twenty-four songs through a P2P
system.2 In the second, a jury found Joel Tenenbaum liable for $675,000
for infringing thirty songs through a P2P system! In bringing these
lawsuits, the recording industry's stated intention was to stop, or at least
slow, what it saw as the rampant theft of its property Of course, putting
the genie back in the bottle is never easy, and there is little evidence that
the lawsuit onslaught has materially slowed the use of P2P networks to
exchange copyrighted music. Perhaps as a result, the recording industry
has begun pushing an alternative approach. Under this approach, the
recording industry has asked Internet service providers to become the
new copyright police, by disconnecting Internet access for customers
who are caught sharing copyrighted music under a "three-strikes-andyou're-out" approach.
Throughout this campaign, the recording industry has treated
unauthorized private copying by consumers as if it both were, and should
be treated as, legally equivalent to the commercial copying at which
copyright was traditionally directed. This, despite the fact that only
twenty-five years ago, as Justice Stevens wrote in his initial draft dissent
in Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios, Inc., "no interested party has
ever seriously suggested that a penalty, or any form of statutory liability,
should be imposed upon an individual for making a single copy of any
copyrighted work for his own private use."5 Congress too has never
indicated that it intended copyright to reach copying by individual
consumers.' Indeed, in 1992, Congress expressly added section 1008 to
1.
See Special Verdict Form, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 0:06-cv01497 (MJD/RLE) (D. Minn. filed Apr. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Thomas-Rasset Jury Verdict
Form]; see also Jury Verdict Form, Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, No. 1:007cv-I 1446-NG (D. Mass. filed Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Tenenbaum Jury Verdict Form].
2.
SeeThomas-Rasset Jury Verdict Form, supra note 1.
3.
SeeTenenbaum Jury Verdict Form, supra note 1.
4.
See Complaint at 19, Thomas-Rasset, No. 0:06-cv-01497 (MJD/RLE); see also
Complaint at 17, Tenenbaum, No. 1:07-cv-I 1446-NG.
5.
Justice John Paul Stevens, First Draft Memorandum, Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., No. 81-1687, at 16 (circulatedJune 13, 1983) (on file with author).
6.
See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1871 (2007); Brief of
Amici Curiae Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors et al. in Support of
Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480)
[hereinafter Grokster Amicus Brief].
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the Copyright Act, which states that "[n]o action may be brought ...
alleging infringement of copyright ... based on the noncommercial use
by a consumer of... a [digital audio recording device or medium] for
making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings."7
Nevertheless, over the last two decades, since the issue first came before
the Court in Sony Corp., courts have extended copyright's prohibition on
copying by competitors to a prohibition on private copying by end
consumers.
A reexamination of the public goods account of copyrighted works
suggests, however, that an extension of copyright to prohibit private
copying generally is likely both unnecessary and affirmatively
undesirable. As a justification for copyright, courts and commentators
have treated copyrighted works as if they were public goods that would
be underproduced in the absence of legal protection. Yet, unbeknownst
to most of those relying on this public goods justification, this
justification for copyright implicitly relies on a particular branch of
public goods economics which deals with the optimal supply of so-called
"continuous" public goods. With continuous public goods, we can have
more or less of the public good at issue. Examples would include such
things as national defense or pollution control. For these kinds of public
goods, the key question is how much of the public good to supply. And
the consistent answer for this type of public good is that the market will
supply too little of the good, relative to the social optimum, absent
government intervention.
While that conclusion tends to support the notion that government
intervention in the form of copyright is necessary to ensure an adequate
supply of original works, the key assumption behind the "continuous"
public good model does not fit original works of authorship very well, at
least not from the perspective of individual consumers. Copyrighted
works, particularly the most popular and economically significant works,
are not simply undifferentiated units of a common, underlying public
good--'"works of authorship." To the contrary, each is separate and
distinct, often with its own unique consumer base. They are not
homogenous, nor perfectly competitive with each other, and some
probably do not compete with each other in an economic sense at all.
Instead, like a bridge, dam, or a lighthouse, they are separate and distinct
(or "discrete") public goods. For such discrete public goods, the key

7.
The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 563, § 2, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992), codifiedatl7U.S.C. § 1008 (2006).

TUL. J TECH.& 1NTELL. PROP.

[Vol. 12

issue is not how much of the public good to produce, but whether to
produce it at all.
If we shift our analysis from treating works of authorship as a single
continuous public good, of which we can produce more or less, to
treating each original work of authorship as an individually discrete
public good, then we reach a much different conclusion regarding the
need for copyright. As we shall see, and as economists have proven, the
market for discrete public goods, unlike the market for continuous public
goods, will not inevitably fail in the absence of government intervention.!
Indeed, for discrete public goods, the self-interest of individual
consumers alone can achieve a socially optimal outcome. While private
markets and individual self-interest will not always prove sufficient to
reach a socially optimum supply of a discrete public good, the fact that
they can differentiates them fundamentally from continuous public
goods.
Before extending the general prohibition on unauthorized copying
that copyright currently applies to commercial entities and would-be
competitors to private copying consumers, perhaps we should consider
the economics of discrete public goods to see if such government
intervention is necessary. Given that the market can work, giving it a
chance to work before we continue the barbaric practice of imposing
bankruptcy on a random handful of those engaged in private copying
through P2P networks to serve as examples for the rest only makes sense.
Moreover, getting the answer right on whether private copying
through P2P networks should constitute copyright infringement is
critically important, and not just for the use of P2P systems for sharing
music today. As technology continues to advance, the issue of private
copying is likely to become only more pressing in the future. Yesterday's
technology made it possible for private consumers to tape songs off the
radio and to make individual photocopies of particular works. Today's
technology has made it easy to copy and share digital music, and other
small digital files. Soon however, as more works move to digital formats
and as bandwidth and memory limitations recede, consumers will find it
8.
See Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, Participation and the Provision of
Discrete Public Goods: A Stategic Analysis, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 171 (1984); see also Anat R.
Admati & Motty Perry, JointProjects Without Commitment, 58 REv. ECON. STUD. 259 (1991);
Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, PrivateProvisionof Public Goods Can Be Efficient,74 PUB.
CHOICE 59 (1992); Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, PrivateProvision of a Discrete Public
Good Efficient Equilibriain the Private-InformationContribution Game, 37 ECON. THEORY 51
(2008); Mark Gradstein, Efficient Provision ofa Discrete Public Good 35 INT'L ECON. REv. 877
(1994); Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo K. Monteiro & Akram Temimi, PrivateProvisionof Discrete
Public Goods with Incomplete Information,35 J. MATH. ECON. 493 (2001).

2009]

DISCRETE PUBLIC GOODS

trivially easy to copy and redistribute virtually every kind of original
work of authorship.
At the same time, the growing importance of the copyright
industries to our economy has also made getting the right answer on the
issue of private copying more salient as well. When copyright was a
quiet backwater and the copyright industries, although extremely visible,
were only a small fraction of our economy's output, the inefficiencies
associated with misjudging copyright's proper scope were correspondingly small. As the copyright industries continue to become a
more important component of our economy as a whole, the costs of such
mistakes, whether they arise from relying on simplistic analogies to real
property or from misunderstanding the underlying economics of
copyright, will only increase.
Understanding if, and when, copyright should attempt to proscribe
private copying deserves far more than the simplistic treatment it has so
far received from a handful of courts. This Essay aims to begin that
conversation. Part I begins by introducing simple models that compare
the market and socially optimal production of continuous and discrete
public goods models and discussing their implications for copyright.
Part II will then focus on the limits of the market's ability to produce
efficiently discrete public goods in the absence of government
intervention. Part III will then consider the implications of the discrete
public goods model for copyright. Finally, in Part IV, I offer some
concluding thoughts.
I.

THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

To determine the proper role for copyright, we begin with two
different approaches to modeling public goods. Both models focus on
public goods, defined as goods characterized by nonrivalrous
consumption. Both models also employ standard Nash equilibrium
conditions to suggest how the market would supply the good at issue, and
then compare the market result to the socially optimal production level.
For both models, we assume perfect information and will evaluate the
market's efficiency using the Pareto optimality standard. Under this
standard, the market result is efficient if and only if there is no way to
change the allocation of goods or resources available that will make at
least one person better off, without making anyone else worse off.
Although our two models will thus share analytic approaches and
efficiency criteria, they differ in the nature of the public good at issue.
The first evaluates the production of a public good where the amount of
the public good at issue can vary. For example, national defense and
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spraying for mosquito control have both been analyzed as continuous
public goods These are not on-off public goods; rather, they are moreor-less public goods. Without trying to pin the "amount" to some
specific numerical quantity, we can, for example, speak of the amount of
national defense in more general terms, ranging from very little to quite a
lot. Because we can plausibly think of the good in terms of additional
units of some common, essentially homogenous underlying good,
economists refer to this branch of public goods economics as dealing
with a continuous public good.
In contrast, other public goods are more accurately characterized by
an on-off production function. Either we produce them or we do not. A
bridge or a dam or a lighthouse might fit this on-off model. Because the
question is whether to produce the good or not, rather than how much of
the good to produce, economists refer to this second type of public good
as a discrete public good.
Of course, neither model is a perfect fit for many real world goods.
A bridge or dam might be made larger or smaller. Similarly, but on the
other side, many continuous public goods begin with an on-off choice.
For example, in defense, we can either have a satellite missile defense
system or not. Nevertheless, sometimes one or the other characterization
may better fit a particular real world problem, so that we can realistically
say that, given the nature of consumer preferences with respect to the
public good at issue, either the continuous or discrete nature
predominates. Having determined which model is more apt, we can look
to that model to see how the market will function in the absence of
government intervention, and thereby better identify whether government
intervention is appropriate.
For both of our models, we will focus on three roommates facing a
decision. In the first model, the decision is how much effort each
roommate will devote to keeping the apartment's common areas clean.
This decision represents our continuous public good case, as the choice is
not on-off, but the degree of cleanliness which can range from filthy to
immaculate. The second concerns whether the three roommates will
purchase a television for their common use. This represents our discrete
public good case, as the key issue is whether to purchase the television or
not. As we shall see, the Nash equilibrium level for cleaning will fall
below the socially optimal level, but the Nash equilibrium for the
television purchase will match the social optimum-which tends, in part,
9.

See Gordon Tullock, Social Cost and Government Action, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 189

(1969) (analyzing mosquito control as a public good).
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to explain why so many college apartments have great televisions, but are
filthy.
A.

The ContinuousPublic Good. Keeping It Clean

We begin with the question of how much effort each roommate
should contribute to keeping the common areas of the apartment clean.
To simplify the analysis, we will assume that the three roommates have
identical preferences for cleanliness and will further assume that the
inverse demand curve for each has a linear relationship. Without loss of
generality, we will take each individual's demand curve to be: 5 - X,
where Xis the amount of cleaning undertaken. For this type of public
good, the supply of Xcan vary from a little, 1, to a lot, 5. For the sake of
simplicity, we will also assume a constant marginal cost, with each "unit"
of cleaning costing 2.
Given these assumptions, if there is only one individual in the
apartment, their optimal level of cleaning occurs where the marginal
value of additional cleaning, reflected in their demand curve, precisely
equals their marginal cost. Thus, 5 - X*
2, where X
is the optimal
level of cleaning for an individual living alone. Solving yields X:,j = 3.
Moreover, with only one individual, the cleaning of the apartment is not a
public good. The Nash equilibrium for an individual living alone is
therefore the socially optimal level of cleanliness as well.
Now, we can extend the model to an apartment with three
roommates. Each of our individuals has the same demand curve, but
cleaning efforts by one person benefit the others equally. We begin with
the "market" or the Nash equilibrium case, where each individual
decides on their own, based upon their own self-interest and their
(correct) expectation of the other's cleaning efforts, how much cleaning
they should undertake.
In this case, individual A solves:
(5- XN)-_X N -X g =N
2; individual B solves: (5 - x )-X- X = 2;
N
= 2, where XN , XN
and individual C solves: (5-XN)-XN -X
and X g are A, B, and Cs Nash equilibrium levels of cleaning
respectively. Because their situations and preferences are symmetric, we

can assume XN

=X

N -X

.

Substituting and solving, we find
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XA = X
Xj
=
Because their cleaning efforts benefit each other
equally, the total level of cleaning is the sum of the three individuals'
cleaning efforts. Thus, the Nash equilibrium level of cleaning with three
roommates is: X 3 =X
+ X + X = 3 -precisely the same as our
socially and individually optimal levels of cleaning for an individual
living alone.
However, with three roommates, this is no longer the socially
optimal level. To determine the socially optimal level, we must
determine the three roommates' joint demand for cleanliness. Assuming
that clean common areas are a public good, we determine the social
demand for cleanliness by summing vertically the demand curves for the
three roommates. Our social demand curve for cleanliness for the three
roommates as a group becomes: 3*(5 - A) or 15 - 3X Given this
demand, we can obtain the optimal level of cleaning, from society's (or a
social planner's) perspective, by again setting marginal benefit (reflected
in society's demand curve) equal to marginal cost, or 15 - 3X =3 = 2.
Solving the equation yields the socially optimal level of cleaning for our
three roommates, which given our assumptions, is X*= 13/3 =4.333.
From this result, we can immediately see that the socially optimal
level of cleaning for the three roommates is higher than both: (1) the
socially and individually optimal levels for an individual living alone and
(2) the Nash equilibrium level for the three roommates. It is easy to see
why the first is true. With a larger population, society values the public
good more highly. Indeed, under the simple assumptions of our model,
twice the population means twice the value, and thrice the population
means thrice the value. The marginal cost of cleaning efforts, on the
other hand, remains constant. The necessary result of this is that at
equilibrium, the optimal supply of cleaning is larger for a population of
three than for a population of one.
With respect to the gap between the socially optimal and Nash
equilibrium levels of cleanliness for our three roommates, this gap
reflects the, by-now, well-known result that the market will fail to achieve
a Pareto optimal supply of public goods in this continuous public goods
case. While the market failure is important for its own sake, three other
points, often overlooked, deserve emphasis. First, despite the academic
10.

Actually, there are multiple Nash equilibrium solutions to the problem. Any selection

of X f e
a[0,3] X
A

is a Nash equilibrium.

e [0,3] ad X
E

E [0,3]
C

XN+XN+XN=3
suhhqha

A

B

C
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and judicial preoccupation with free-riding, the market (as reflected in
the Nash equilibrium levels of cleaning) fails to achieve the socially
optimal level of cleanliness even though none of the roommates is freeriding. To the contrary, all are cleaning in the amount they have
determined to be individually optimal.
Second, the issue is also not simply one of incentive compatibility,
where we try to devise a mechanism that will force each to divulge their
true valuation of the public good at issue. In our model, none of the
roommates is shirking nor otherwise lying about their true valuation of a
clean apartment. To the contrary, all are setting their effort levels based
upon their actual valuations, which the other roommates are assumed to
know.
Third, the gap between the Nash equilibrium and the socially
optimal levels increases as the population increases. Indeed, in our
example, as the population approaches infinity, the market (as reflected
by the Nash equilibrium level) remains stuck at 3, yet the socially
optimal level of cleanliness approaches 5, as a limit. This larger gap does
not arise, however, because a larger population makes it easier to engage
in free riding or generates larger transaction costs. Rather, the larger gap
arises because each individual's cleaning efforts now benefit more
people, thus generating a larger external benefit. As the gap between the
social and private value of each individual's efforts increases, the gap
between the socially optimal and individually optimal levels of
cleanliness control will also increase.
Because of the external benefit that each individual's cleaning
efforts generates, and the resulting gap between private and social
benefit, solving the market failure in this instance requires some method
of internalizing this external benefit. Perhaps the easiest way is to allow
a government to determine the optimal level of cleanliness and to pay for
it using tax revenue generated by a benefits tax--one that taxes
individuals according to the benefit they receive from the program.
While such a solution can be efficient under the right circumstances, it is
not the only solution. At least, in theory, private market transactions by
which each individual is allowed to charge the others for the external
benefits each individual's cleaning efforts generates would also solve the
market failure. While the transaction costs associated with such a
solution might prove insurmountable, allowing offsets would
substantially reduce the transaction costs and would make such a private
market solution more feasible. Specifically, with offsets, because the
total external benefits each individual would be entitled to collect would
exactly equal the amount each individual owed, if all individuals had
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identical preference structures and engaged in the socially optimal level
of cleanliness, no actual side payments would be required except from
those otherwise investing too little in cleaning.
However, when we move beyond the starting assumption of known
and identical preferences, either of these solutions would prove difficult
to implement. If we know that preferences among individuals vary, but
not how, determining both how much of the public good is optimal, and
how to allocate the price for the public good, will prove problematic. If
we attempt to allocate the price on a benefits basis, charging individuals
more who we believe value the good more highly, individuals will have
an incentive to understate their true valuation of the good. On the other
hand, if we attempt to allocate the price pro rata, charging each individual
who benefits an equal share of the total expenditure, individuals who
value the public good more highly will have a tendency to overstate their
preferences for the good, knowing their consumption of it will be
subsidized by others.
Although there are some useful insights here for copyright law, and
for the rhetoric of copyright more generally, before we attempt to apply
these insights to copyright, let us see how our roommates fare in trying to
purchase a television for their common use.
B.

The DiscretePublic Goods Model Three Men anda Television

For our second model, consider the same three roommates looking
to purchase a television for their joint use. In order to make the
television a public good, I will assume that they have compatible viewing
choices-that is they all want to watch the same programs at the same
time, and any differences in viewing preferences occur when the other
roommates are not around. Unlike cleaning the apartment, the choice
here is not how much television to purchase, but whether to purchase the
television at all." If we assume that the television costs $90, then
following the usual vertical summation rule for public goods, the three
roommates should purchase the television if and only if the total of their
individual valuations exceeds the television's cost. In addition, the
roommates must also decide how to allocate the price between them.
To allocate the price between the roommates, the roommates are
considering two possible rules. In the first, the roommates each pay onethird of the television's price, with the threat of exclusion for those who
Again, we could make it a continuous public good problem by allowing the qualities
11.
of the television, such as screen size or viewing quality, to vary, or alternatively, by renting the
television on an hourly basis.
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refuse to contribute. I shall refer to this rule for payment as the
"property-based" or uniform price approach. The second approach relies
on voluntary contributions. In this approach, the roommates each
announce how much they value the television, and based upon their
announced values, if the sum of the announced values equals or exceeds
the television's price, they each contribute to the television's price
proportionally based upon their announced values. There is no threat of
exclusion if the television is purchased under this second approach.
Instead, the only threat is that if the announced contributions do not cover
the television's price, the television will not be purchased. I shall refer to
this rule for payment as the voluntary contribution approach.
Given these basic assumptions and two rule systems, we can now
examine three cases. In the first, the roommates value the television
identically, while the second and third present somewhat more plausible
scenarios where their valuations differ. For each case, we will consider
the efficiency of our two price allocation rules. To be Pareto optimal, a
price allocation rule must satisfy two requirements. First, it must lead the
roommates to purchase the television when the sum of their individual
valuations equals or exceeds the television's price. Second, because the
good at issue is a public good, it is not Pareto optimal to exclude
nonpayers, and thus to be efficient, the rule system must not exclude one
of the roommates from enjoying the television if the set is purchased.
Case #1: Identical Valuations of$40 Each. In this case, the sum of
the three roommates' valuation is more than the price of the television,
and the proper decision is therefore to purchase the television. As for
allocating the television's price in this category, the property-based rule
works perfectly. Each roommate is willing to contribute their one-third
share, because that share ($30) is less than their reservation price for the
television ($40). Moreover, even in the absence of a threat of individual
exclusion, a property-based rule is incentive compatible. If any one of
the three roommates falsely asserts that they are unwilling to contribute
towards the television, the roommates will not have enough to purchase
the television. As a result, purely from their own self-interest, each
roommate has the necessary incentive to be honest and contribute
towards the television's purchase. Finally, because everyone contributes,
it is unnecessary to follow through on the threat implicit in the propertybased approach that noncontributors will be excluded from watching the
television. Thus, in this case, under a property-based approach, the
public good is acquired, everyone contributes towards it, and everyone
gets to enjoy it. The property-based approach is therefore Pareto optimal
in this case.
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While the property-based approach is efficient, the voluntary
contribution scheme can be as well. In the voluntary contribution game,
each player announces their reservation price for the television. If the
total announced valuations are less than the television's price, then the
television is not purchased.'2 If the total announced valuations are equal
to or greater than the television's price, then the television is purchased,
and each roommate contributes to the price of the television a
proportionate share based upon the announced valuations. For example,
if the three roommates each announce a valuation of $30, then the sum is
$90, the television is purchased, and each roommate contributes $30 to
the price. If, on the other hand, roommates A and B announce reservation prices of $40 each, while C announces a reservation price of $10,
then again the sum is $90, the television is purchased, but in this instance,
A and B contribute $40 a piece, while C contributes $10. While there
may be an issue as to whether Cs contribution is fair in the second
example, either of these allocations is Pareto optimal according to the
standards we have established. The roommates purchase the television
and no one is excluded from watching it.
The concern, of course, is that C (or A or B) will try to free ride,
and that all three will announce a valuation of $0, each hoping that the
others will pick up the television's full price. As long as no individual
roommate's individual valuation exceeds the price, this too is a Nash
equilibrium.' 3 If C accurately predicts that A and B will announce
valuations of $0, then Chas no reason to announce a valuation in excess
of $0 because C does not value the television sufficiently alone to
purchase it.
This creates two possible Nash equilibrium outcomes." First, each
roommate announces a valuation of $0 and the television is not
purchased. Second, the roommates announce individual valuations that
exactly sum to $90 and purchase the television.
Under this second scenario, the price of the television may be
allocated among the roommates in a variety of ways, but each of the
12. This rule effectively establishes a subscription game, rather than a contribution game
as those terms are used in the economics literature. In a subscription game, players commit sums
to the purchase of the public good, but if the good is not purchased, those sums are refunded. In a
contribution game, players make donations towards the public good, but those donations are not
refunded even if insufficient donations are received to pay for the public good. See Palfrey &
Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 173 (distinguishing between games with a no-refund rule and those
with a refund rule).
13. If one of the roommate's individual valuations exceeds the purchase price, then there
is only a single Nash equilibrium: the other two roommates will announce a valuation of zero and
allow that roommate to purchase the television.
14. For a formal proof of these outcomes, see Palfrey & Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 174.
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Nash equilibrium solutions in this set will fall on the Pareto efficient
frontier. Moreover, for each of these equilibria, the announced valuations
will sum to exactly $90. If the total of the announced valuations is less
than $90, one (or more) of the roommates will increase their announced
valuation until the sum totals $90. Otherwise, the roommates will not get
the television and each values the television enough to avoid that result.
Similarly, if the total of the announced valuations exceed $90, one of the
roommates will reduce their announced valuation until the sum totals
$90. After all, as long as the announcements equal $90 the television set
will be purchased. The only thing that announcing a valuation that leads
to a sum in excess of $90 will achieve is to force one of the roommates to
pay more than necessary to ensure that the television is purchased. Thus,
for the second set of Nash equilibria, the voluntary contribution rule
satisfies our two efficiency criteria and achieves a Pareto optimal result
in this case. The television is purchased, and no one is excluded from
watching.
The key question is which of the two Nash equilibrium outcomes
the roommates will reach. Usually, we would expect roommates to have
available a sufficient range of informal mechanisms to encourage
cooperation, including initial sorting and "voting off the island," to
ensure that one of the Pareto efficient Nash equilibria is reached.
Yet, even without a mechanism to encourage informal cooperation,
it is more likely that the roommates will reach one of the efficient Nash
equilibria, rather than the inefficient equilibrium. To begin with, each of
the efficient Nash equilibria represents a Pareto improvement over the
inefficient equilibrium. At least one of the roommates will be better off,
and none of them will be worse off, if they can reach one of the efficient
Nash equilibria. In addition, the efficient Nash equilibria are stable,
while the inefficient equilibrium is not. 5 At any of the efficient Nash
equilibria, any change in the announced valuations will reduce at least
one of the roommate's utility. If any roommate reduces their announced
valuation, then the television will not be bought, bringing a resulting
reduction in utility. If any roommate increases their announced
valuation, that roommate will simply pay a larger share of the television's
price, reducing that roommate's utility. Thus, no roommate has any
incentive to move from the efficient Nash equilibria. In contrast, the
inefficient Nash equilibrium is not stable. If a roommate expects the
others to announce a valuation of zero, then we assumed that the
15. For a formal proof, see Bagnoli & Lipman, supra note 8, at 75-78. For a discussion of
the concepts economists use to sort Nash equilibria, see EPIc VAN DAMME, REFINEMENTS OF THE
NASH EQULBRIUM CONCEPT (M. Beckmann & W Krelle eds., 1983).
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roommate should announce a value of zero in reply, but that is not an
optimal strategy. Given the expected announcements from the other two,
whether the third also announces a zero value, or his true valuation, in
either case, the television will not be purchased. So announcing a
nonzero value entails no cost. However, announcing a nonzero valuation
creates, at least, some possibility that the television will be purchased.
Perhaps the roommate is mistaken in his expectations regarding his
roommates' intentions, or perhaps, although correct in his expectations,
the other roommates make a mistake and announce nonzero valuations
when they had intended to announce zero valuations. Even if these
mistakes are unlikely, announcing a nonzero valuation at least opens the
door to the possibility that the television will be purchased. With some
upside, and no downside, announcing his true valuation is therefore the
appropriate choice even if a roommate expects the others to announce
zero valuations. This holds true for the other roommates as well.
As a result, the inefficient, "everyone announces zero value"
strategy, while technically a Nash equilibrium, is not a stable one. The
roommates should not expect each other to announce a zero value, and
even if they did have such an expectation, their own best response is not
to announce a zero valuation, but to announce their true valuation. Yet,
as soon as they move from the "everyone announces zero value" strategy,
the only other Nash equilibria available are the Pareto efficient ones.
Case #2 Varying Valuations,A andB $40 Each, C $10. Here, the
valuations sum to exactly $90, and hence the television should be
purchased." The property-based rule fails to achieve that result, however.
Although the property-based approach is incentive compatible, Cs
reservation value for the television is less than his pro rata share, so he
will not contribute to the television's purchase. Moreover, lacking C's
contribution, A and B's valuations together will no longer cover the price
of the television. As a result, the roommates will not purchase the
television if they try to allocate the price amongst them according to the
property-based approach. Thus, the property-based approach in this case
fails the first efficiency criteria: the television was not purchased when it
should have been (an "insufficient incentive" market failure).
In contrast, the voluntary contribution rule remains efficient.'7 In
this case, each of the roommates' own self-interest will lead them to
16. Although the valuations sum to exactly $90, economists commonly use the
assumption that each individual values the good at some very slight amount in excess of the
stated value to break ties, and I will follow that practice here.
17. Again, a zero announced valuation Nash equilibrium exists, but it is dominated by the
Pareto efficient equilibrium for the reasons previously discussed.
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announce his valuation honestly. A and B will announce valuations of
$40 apiece, and Cwill announce a valuation of $10. The roommates will
therefore purchase the television and split the price accordingly. C will
pay less than A and B, but that is a true reflection of Cs lower valuation.
As a result, the voluntary contribution scheme is fair, as well as efficient,
though A and B, because they cannot be certain of Cs honesty, may
perceive the allocation as unfair.
Case #3." Varying Valuations,A and B $50 Each, C $20. In this
case, the property-based approach leads to a different type of market
failure. As in Case #2, C will not pay a pro rata share for the television.
But here, even without C, A and B's valuations together are sufficient to
pay for the television. Thus, A and B will purchase the television, but in
order to discourage dishonesty from C, they will exclude C from
watching. The property-based rule therefore fails the second efficiency
criteria in this case: it excludes an individual from enjoying the
television even though it is a public good characterized by nonrivalrous
consumption (an "exclusionary" market failure).
In contrast, the voluntary contribution approach remains efficient,
at least for the robust Nash equilibria. As in Case #1, there are an infinite
number of Nash equilibrium solutions, allocating the television's price
among the three roommates in different ways. But for each of these
Nash equilibria, the total announced contributions will sum to exactly
$90, for the reasons explained in Case #1, ensuring that the roommates
purchase the television and thereby satisfy the first efficiency criteria.
Interestingly, in some of the Nash equilibrium solutions, C makes
no contribution to the purchase of the television whatsoever. Despite Cs
free riding in these cases, A and B will pick up the slack and announce
valuations that sum to $90, ensuring that the television set is purchased.
Of course, A and B would like Cto contribute, but unless we modify the
game in some way to include, for example, reputational concerns that
might arise in a repeat game setting, if C refuses to contribute, A and B
would prefer to cover the price of the television themselves rather than do
without. Moreover, because the contribution scheme is voluntary, relying
on announced intentions to contribute, even if Crefuses to contribute, he
will not be excluded from watching the television, thus ensuring that the
second efficiency criteria is also satisfied.
Summary of Three Cases- The voluntary contributions approach
can thus achieve a Pareto optimal outcome in each of the three cases
considered. The property-based approach, in contrast, fails to achieve
such an outcome in two of the three cases, and indeed, ensures an
efficient outcome only in the most unrealistic case, where all consumers
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value the public good identically. Moreover, while most readers are
likely familiar with the "exclusionary" market failure that the propertybased approach generates in the third case, the "insufficient incentive"
market failure that the property-based approach generates in the second
case may come as a surprise, particularly to those who tout a stronger,
more property-like vision of copyright as essential to ensuring sufficient
incentives.
As for the notion that a price discrimination scheme can prove just
as efficient as the voluntary contribution scheme, that notion is false. An
effective price discrimination scheme would require the seller either to
know each roommate's valuation, or to devise a market mechanism that
separates the three roommates according to their ability to pay. Given
that only one television is being purchased, it is not immediately apparent
how the seller could establish such a mechanism. Even in a market
setting where price discrimination schemes were available, such as the
common practice of separating high value from low value consumers in
the book market by offering a novel in only a high priced hardback
version for a year before offering a lower priced paperback, such
schemes inevitably entail transaction and other costs that the voluntary
contributions approach does not.'8 Moreover, in practice, even the most
effective price discrimination schemes inevitably sort high- and lowvaluation consumers only roughly. In contrast, with a voluntary
contribution system, each consumer decides their own contribution level
and necessarily has perfect information regarding their own valuation.
As a result, even a near-perfect price discrimination scheme can only
approximate the efficiency of a voluntary contribution system and does
so at much greater expense.
C

A Comparison of the Two Models and Their Results

Although the continuous and discrete public good models point to
important differences, they also agree on certain issues. Both models
suggest that a focus on free riding is misguided. In the first model, the
market fails without any free riding. In the second model, the voluntary
contribution rule can be Pareto efficient despite the presence of free
riding. Taken together, the two models thus suggest that free riding is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for market failure.
Similarly, in the first model, the market fails even though the individuals
contribute to the public good honestly based upon their true valuations of
18.
See, e.g., Glynn S.Lunney, Jr., Copynight Thce DiscriminationPanacea,21 HARV.
J.L. &TECH. 387 (2008).
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the good. In the second model, the voluntary contribution rule can be
Pareto efficient even though the roommates are not invariably honest
regarding their valuations of the public good. As was the case for free
riding, the models taken together thus suggest that incentive
compatibility is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to identify
market failure.
Despite these similarities, the models also differ in critical respects.
Under the second model, with a voluntary contribution rule, individual
self-interest alone can produce sufficient incentives for the production of
the discrete public good. The only question is whether the roommates
will be able to reach one of the efficient Nash equilibrium solution or
whether endless bickering over who should pay how much will preclude
them from ever reaching one of the Pareto efficient Nash equilibria. But
the issue of reaching a Nash equilibrium is a radically different one from
the market failures traditionally associated with continuous public
goods-a second order rather than a primary consideration. In terms of
analogies, reaching a Nash equilibrium in the discrete public good model
entails the same sort of strategic behavior concerns that arise in the
context of bilateral monopoly negotiations. As in the bilateral monopoly
case, the bluffing, posturing, and other gamesmanship that may occur as
each party tries to minimize their own contribution to the public good
creates the possibility that the parties will not reach the efficient outcome
to which their own self-interest should lead them. Although this concern
is real, it has not justified a general rule of government intervention in
cases involving bilateral monopoly, where the government would force
"desirable" bargains on the two monopolists and then allocate the bargain
surplus between them. Nor should it justify a similar rule of government
intervention in the form of copyright in the discrete public goods case.
Moreover, the two models also differ when extended from a few
individuals to the large numbers case. As discussed, in the first model, as
the number of individuals who enjoy the continuous public good
increases, the gap between the market and socially-optimal output of the
public good also increases. In contrast, the voluntary contributions
approach remains efficient at ensuring production of a discrete public
good, even as the model is extended from three roommates to a much
larger group. As with the smaller group, self-interest alone is sufficient
to generate the necessary incentives to create or acquire the public good,
as long as the now much larger group of individuals who will benefit
from the public good can reach an efficient Nash equilibrium allocation
of the price. As the numbers increase, the transaction costs entailed in
reaching a Nash equilibrium may increase somewhat, but even so, to
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achieve the efficient result, no one needs to consider how their actions
affect another. Unlike the continuous goods model, a set of side
payments, or the threat thereof, are unnecessary to achieve a Pareto
optimal outcome. In that sense, self interest alone is sufficient to
generate the necessary incentives as long as one of the efficient Nash
equilibrium can be reached.
1I.

LIMITS OF THE DISCRETE PUBLIC GOODS MODEL

Before we embrace fully the conclusions of the discrete public
goods model, there are two key concerns we need to discuss. The first
concern is whether works of authorship are or should be treated as a
single continuous public good or as discrete public goods. The second
concern is whether an efficient Nash equilibrium is attainable in the
absence of perfect information.
A.

Are Works ofAuthorshlp Continuous orDiscretePublic Goods?

Given the differing conclusions of the continuous and discrete
models, it becomes fairly important to determine which more accurately
represents the production of works of authorship. Yet, there has been no
real discussion of the issue. To the contrary, since Landes and Posner
modeled works of authorship as a continuous public good in their
groundbreaking article, An Economic Analysis of Copylight Law,
subsequent commentators have fallen almost uniformly in line."
To a considerable degree, whether we characterize works of
authorship as continuous or discrete will depend on who is doing the
copying, at least as a first cut. If we are focusing on competitors, or other
commercial entities, then the continuous good characterization probably
fits the nature of the real world demand at issue. Copying competitors
see each new work simply as a profit opportunity and are relatively
indifferent to the particular aspects of the work that may differentiate
them to end consumers.
In contrast, end consumers are far more likely to see individual
works of authorship as discrete public goods. Everyone has their favorite
book, their favorite song, and their favorite movie. If we were to try and
create a demand curve for "works of authorship" as if that were a
relevant economic market, we would find that demand aggregation is
extremely difficult. Preference structures among end consumers with
respect to the different works in the market are likely to vary
19. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyight Law,
18 J.LEG. STUD. 325 (1989).
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substantially. As a consequence, we would find consumers entering and
leaving the market, as the works they happen to like become the marginal
work. Yet, in order to model works of authorship as continuous goods,
we must be able to identify the marginal work at each point in the
demand curve. In order to create the demand curve, we would, as a
practical matter, simply sum the demand for that individual work, and
then place it artificially into the demand curve at the relevant point. As a
result, to create the necessary continuous good demand curve, we are
treating each work of authorship as an individual good, so why not
evaluate their production that way directly rather than force fitting them
into a continuous good model?
Even from the perspective of end consumers, however, there may be
some classes of works for which the continuous public good model fits
reasonably well. Terry Fisher used the examples of pornography and law
review case notes as instances where additional works might be
considered, even by end consumers, as an undifferentiated stream of
widgets." Romance novels, pulp fiction, and other read-and-toss novels
might also satisfy the assumptions implicit in the continuous public good
model. News and factual information might satisfy the assumptions as
well. For these types of works, consumers might not care about which
particular work they receive. Instead, they may simply want another unit
in a relatively homogenous stream of works.
How end consumers perceive works is thus crucial. Dividing public
goods into either discrete or continuous for the convenience of economic
modeling is a trivial and neat exercise. We simply adopt one set of
assumptions or the other. Yet, mapping those models, and their
archetypes, onto real world markets is ultimately an empirical issue likely
to prove neither trivial nor neat. Yet, there are clearly gradations in the
extent to which end consumers consider a work distinct. At one end of
the spectrum, we have those popular and iconic works, instantly
recognized, often imitated, sometimes parodied, but still unique. At the
other, we have works that consumers consider effectively indistinguishable from other similar works.
This suggests that the discrete public good model best fits instances
of alleged copyright infringement by end consumers of popular and
distinctive entertaining works. This is precisely the sort of unauthorized
copying and distribution most likely to occur through P2P networks.2 '
20.

William W Fisher, Restructuringthe FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1661, 1795

n.208 (1988).
21.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright Digital Technology, Private
Copying,and the DigitalMillennium CopytightAct 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 885-86 (2001).
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Information andEquilibria

The second key limitation on applying the discrete public goods
model to works of authorship is information. With perfect information,
as in our roommates hypothetical, all of the stable Nash equilibria are
Pareto efficient because each roommate knows the others' valuations and
so knows whether they have to up their bid in order to ensure the
purchase of the television. Without that information, an inefficient Nash
equilibrium becomes possible.2 ' However, as it turns out, to achieve an
efficient outcome, the would-be consumers of a discrete public good do
not need perfect information regarding each others' preferences. Rather,
they only need three pieces of information: (1) their own valuation of the
good, v,; (2) the cost or price of the good, P, and (3) the total valuation of
all of the goods' consumers, V = Z vi. Given these three pieces of
information and assuming that V > P, there is a perfect and dominant
Nash equilibria that is also Pareto efficient: each consumer should
contribute their pro rata share of the good's cost, defined as ci =
(Viv)p.23

In order for this strategy to achieve efficient outcomes, it is not
necessary for consumers to know each others' valuations. The
mechanism does not rely on one consumer policing another's
contribution. Self-interest alone will lead each consumer to contribute
appropriately. If each consumer adopts this strategy, a failure or refusal
by anyone to contribute their share means that the public good will not be
produced.24 As long as V > P, each consumer values the public good
more than their pro share. Given a choice between making the pro rata
contribution and having the public good, or not making the contribution
and not having the public good, each consumer should rationally choose
22. Even with imperfect information regarding the other consumers' preferences, an
inefficient outcome is not inevitable. For a discussion of when an efficient outcome remains
achievable, see Barbieri & Malueg, supra note 8; Menezes, Monteiro & Temini, supa note 8.
23. As in the roommates hypothetical, other strategies, where for example one person
contributes less than their share, while another contributes more, may still constitute Nash
equilibria as long as they result in contributions equal to the price of the public good. However,
unless we are willing to assume that some individuals have a taste or preference for self-sacrifice,
such equilibria likely entail additional transaction costs compared to the pro rata contribution
strategy, and are therefore not as attractive over a repeated series of contribution games.
24. In that sense, the mechanism represents a form of Lindahl taxation. See E. Lindahl,
Just Taxation--A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168-76
(Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1958); see also
Bagnoli & Lipman, supm note 8, at 65-66 (describing the Pareto efficient Nash equilibria as
forcing each consumer to choose between "the status quo point (chosen by contributing less than
the agent's equilibrium contribution) and a Pareto preferred point (chosen by contributing the
equilibrium contribution)").
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to make the contribution simply to maximize their own utility. Of
course, a consumer can contribute less and hope that some other
consumer will pick up the shortfall, but hope is not a rational economic
strategy in this case. And for the other consumers, picking up the
shortfall, even if it seems sensible in a particular case, is also not rational
as it will interfere with reaching efficient outcomes in repeated cycles of
the contributions game.
Accepting that a voluntary contribution system is Pareto efficient
given these three pieces of information, the question still remains
whether consumers will have even this minimum level of information. A
consumer presumably knows their own valuation of a work. There is, of
course, the risk that a work will not bear out a consumer's initial
valuation of its worth, but that risk is common to both a property-based
system and a voluntary contribution system. Indeed, some voluntary
contribution mechanisms permit a consumer to make their contribution
after obtaining access to the work, thereby minimizing the risk of such
mistakes. As for the second piece of information necessary for the
mechanism to work, the author or publisher will also presumably state
the total cost or price for creating and disseminating the work, though
this is not as clear cut as it at first appears. That leaves only the total of
all consumers' valuations.
Outside the roommate scenario, it may seem difficult or even
impossible for consumers to know enough regarding other consumers'
preferences that each consumer can determine the sum of all consumers'
valuations of a given discrete public good. Nevertheless, there are
several proxies that a consumer could reliably use to approximate a
popular work's total value. For music, radio airplay, together with
concert and merchandise revenues, may provide a reasonable basis for
estimating a given work's total value. For established authors and artists,
in particular, consumers may also look to the popularity of the author's
previous work.
Like any other industry, the entertainment and recording industries
already make estimates of this sort every time they invest in a work.
While they undoubtedly get the answer wrong from time-to-time, their
answers must come reasonably close most of the time, or else they would
not remain in business. There is little reason to expect that consumers
would be unable to make similar estimates.25
25. This approach to estimating the total value of the work raises the possibility that an
author or artist will try to extract the full surplus associated with a work from consumers by
setting the price of the work equal to the estimated total value, so that every consumer will
estimate their pro rata share as 100% of their individual valuation.
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Undoubtedly, consumer attempts at estimating any given work's
value will likely prove imperfect and will thereby render the voluntary
contribution mechanism an imperfect solution to the public goods
problem. Yet, any other solution is also likely to prove imperfect, as well.
Numerous commentators over the years, including myself, have
extensively documented the problems that arise from granting a right to
exclude with respect to a public good characterized by nonrivalrous
consumption.26 The question becomes which of two necessarily
imperfect solutions is less imperfect. While that is an impossible
question to answer in the abstract, the fundamentally different
conclusions that the discrete public good model reaches suggests that we
ought, at the very least, to consider those conclusions as we structure
copyright law, particularly in cases involving consumer copying of
popular works by established authors and artists where the discrete public
goods model is most applicable.
C.

Working Examples

While the notion of voluntary contributions may seem unduly
utopian, there are any number of working examples of such systems.
Consider the case of lighthouses. While often cited as a paradigmatic
case of a public good that requires government provision,27 some of the
first lighthouses built in this country, including the Sandy Hook
Lighthouse at the south entrance to the New York harbor, relied entirely
on voluntary contributions.28 Lighthouses are, after all, discrete, rather
than continuous, public goods. Moreover, particularly for lighthouses
associated with a specific harbor, the three pieces of information needed
for a voluntary contribution system to work were readily available. Each
shipowner who used the harbor knew their own valuation of the
lighthouse, as well as the likely price for the lighthouse. Moreover, like
the roommates, the shipowners for a given harbor were a close and small
enough group that each shipowner had a pretty reasonable sense for the
extent and nature of the cargoes, and the associated profitability of the
other shipowners. Thus, each shipowner was reasonably able to estimate
26. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 18; Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers:
IndividualRlghts and Social Values in IntellectualProperty,68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1993);
David McGowan, CopyightNonconsequentialism,69 Mo. L. REv. 1 (2004).
27.
See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 45, 151
(6th ed. 1964); Richard A. Posner, Nobel Laureate; Ronald Coase andMethodology, 7 J. ECON.
PERSP. 195, 200 (1993) (recognizing the lighthouse as a "classic (perhaps hackneyed would be a
better term) example of a public good").
28.

U.S. COAST GUARD, HISTORICALLY FAMOUS LIGHTHOUSES 63-64 (1972).
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the total value of the lighthouse and determine their appropriate pro rata
share of its cost.
Not all lighthouses were located near harbors, however. For remote
locations, such as the Outer Banks, we would not expect the contribution
mechanism to work as well-and not because of the risk of free riders, at
least not as traditionally understood. Rather, the remoteness of the
location would make it difficult to identify everyone who benefits from
the lighthouse, and hence to estimate the lighthouse's total value.
Perhaps for that reason, the federal government took over responsibility
for providing lighthouses as one of its very first acts.29 Yet, government
provision was not notably more effective at providing lighthouses where
they were needed than the private system it replaced. Responding at least
as much, if not more, to political concerns, we ended up with multiple
and redundant lighthouses near populous cities, making lighthouses an
early form of pork. Lighthouses for navigationally dangerous, but
remote areas, such as the Florida Keys or Cape Hatteras, were not a
priority." The lighthouse example thus serves as a useful reminder both
that the private market can supply discrete public goods in some
circumstances, and that even where the private market does not work
perfectly, government intervention may not improve the situation very
much.
Moving closer in time and context, we also find several recent
examples of contribution systems for works of authorship that take
advantage of the power of the Internet. Stephen King was one of the first
established authors to venture outside the boundaries of traditional
publishing with his novella, The Plant He made each chapter of The
Plant freely available for download, and promised to publish the next
chapter if he received an effective contribution rate of seventy-five cents
per download.' As I have explained elsewhere: "The contribution rate
29. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, § 1, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Stat. 53, 53-54.
30. See FRANCIS Ross HOLLAND, JR., AMERICA'S LIGHTHOUSES: THEIR ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY SINCE 1716, at 29 (1972) (noting that inspectors both in 1838 and again in 1851 found
that "whereas the comparatively safe shores of heavily populated areas were liberally dotted with
lighthouses, the unsafe shores of unpopulated areas did not have many lights even though those
shores saw heavy traffic"). Even with government provision, a private market solution is still
possible. If the government fails to supply a lighthouse where it is needed, shipowners could still
come together and arrange for one. However, the government intervention in such situations
often seems to crowd out, or remove the impetus for, a private market solution. See James
Andreoni, An Expeimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-OutHypothesis, 83 AM. ECON.
REv. 1317, 1325 (1993) (finding that government provision of a public good resulted in
incomplete crowding out).
31.
King actually requested one dollar per download, but required only seventy-five
percent of people who downloaded a chapter to contribute.
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hovered at over seventy percent for the first few installments, as
consumers voluntarily contributed in order to ensure the availability of
future installments. The contribution rate fell below King's threshold
only when he announced3 2the series' end and removed the incentive for
consumers to contribute.

Given the economics of discrete public goods, that such a
contribution mechanism should work is unsurprising. King did rely on a
different approach than pro rata contributions to reach a Nash
equilibrium. Under his approach, he provided: (1) a public statement of
the price for the next chapter and (2) a continuously updated public
statement of current contribution levels. With this information, each
consumer could immediately perceive whether sufficient contributions
had been made to ensure continuation of the work and could respond
appropriately. If necessary, those who valued additional chapters could
(and did) make additional contributions up to their reservation value to
ensure that the next chapter was made available.33 While we should
expect a certain degree of brinkmanship with this approach, as some
consumers may hold back on contributing hoping that another consumer
will pick up the necessary slack, it represents an alternative mechanism
to reaching a Nash equilibrium outcome that is also Pareto efficient.
In the musical world, Nine Inch Nails and Radiohead have both
recently released albums using a contribution model. While Radiohead's
digital release of its album, In Rainbows, was a low quality stream
intended primarily to boost sales of its subsequent CD release, Nine Inch
Nails has released nine of its songs from its album Ghost I-IVfor free."
For five dollars, a fan can get the remaining twenty-seven songs and has
the option of getting the files in lossless formats. 5
Importantly, a contribution mechanism for paying for a discrete
public good is not a gift or tipping economy. In fact, as the King
32.
SeeLunney, supranote 21, at 863-64.
33.
See Don O'Briant, 'Plant'FansPayTheir Way, TIMES UNiON (Albany, NY), Aug. 27,
2000, at J4, availableat www.lexis.com/research (follow "Find a Source" tab; search "The Times
Union"; then follow "the Times Union (Albany)" hyperlink; search "Plant Fans Pay Their Way")
("Amazon.com, which is processing payments for King, reports that some readers have been
sending in extra money for the $1 installments-from $2 to $20-to make up for deadbeat
downloaders.").
34. See, e.g., Dan Goodin, Nine Inch Nails Cracks Net Distribution (Maybe), THE
REGISTER (U.K.), Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/03/nine inch-nails-album_
releasedonline/ ("Unlike the much-ballyhooed online release a few months ago of the most
recent Radiohead album, the Nine Inch Nails experiment is a lot easier to take seriously. That's
because Reznor has made the album available in both lossless and high-bit rate formats.
Radiohead's In Rainbows, by contrast, came as only a 160 kbps MP3, which hardly seemed worth
the time it took to download it.").
35. Id.
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example reflects, a contribution scheme might look little different in
some respects from existing copyright-based payment systems. The
author still sets the price. The key difference is that consumers, who have
better information regarding their own valuation of the work, decide for
themselves whether and, if so, how much to contribute towards the price
the author has set. Moreover, consumers contribute not out of a sense of
generosity or gratitude, but for the same reason that they purchase a good
in more traditional markets-to ensure access to the work. True, the
connection is a little less direct, in that some consumers can obtain the
work without contributing. The essential quid pro quo, however,
remains. Consumers, as a group, must meet the author's price in order to
receive the work.36
III. REWIRING COPYRIGHT To REFLECT THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETE
PUBLIC GOODS

A.

RadicalRevision?

The discrete public goods model thus suggests a need to revisit
some of the assumptions behind copyright. Taken to its full logical
extent, the model indicates that radical revision of copyright may be
desirable. Indeed, it raises the question whether we need copyright at all.
Even with respect to competitor copying, those competitors must still
turn around and sell their unauthorized copies to the end consumers. As
long as consumers can distinguish authorized from unauthorized copies,
and even if the unauthorized copies are less expensive, the discrete public
goods model suggests that consumers will purchase the authorized
copies to the extent necessary to ensure the creation of the original work.
Consider again the Stephen King novella, The Plant. King
conditioned the availability of the next chapter on receiving a certain
price based on the number of downloads. To ensure the integrity of his
pricing condition, he necessarily had to control downloading and the
distribution of unauthorized copying. His per-download pricing method,
however, was tied to the old business model of the traditional publishing
industry where the production and distribution of each additional copy of
a work entailed some significant costs. When translated onto the
Internet, no cost-based justification for such pricing exists. Instead, it
reflects an attempt by King to extract a return based upon the value of the
work to consumers, rather than based merely on his costs. The number
of hours required to write a given chapter may vary somewhat depending
36. In the Stephen King example, while the contributions are tied to the download of one
chapter, they are not in fact payments for that chapter, but for the next one.
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on how popular King expects the work to be, but they are unlikely to
vary in a linear fashion. Whether a given chapter turns out to be mildly
popular or wildly popular, King's effort in writing it will likely have been
relatively constant. In today's copyright-based economy, pricing systems
attempt to extract from consumers a much higher payment for wildly
popular works, even where no additional costs are involved. This
represents an attempt to extract the work's value from consumers, and is
a pricing approach fundamentally inconsistent with competitive markets.
However, in a true voluntary contribution model, an author or artist
would set payment level based upon their own cost, not based upon the
value of the work to consumers. Thus, instead of setting a per-download
charge that aims to capture some percentage of the demand for the work,
King should have stated his own reservation price-a total number of
dollars necessary to persuade him to write and release the next chapter.
Had King done so, then a prohibition on copying, whether by
competitors or by end consumers, would have been not only entirely
unnecessary, but affirmatively undesirable." The more consumers who
read the initial chapter, the more consumers there would be to contribute
to the production of later chapters. Moreover, whatever unauthorized
copying occurred, it would merely shift some part of the marginal cost of
making and distributing copies of the work from the author to the
copiers. A prohibition on consumer copying would therefore be
affirmatively undesirable. Under such an approach, King would not even
need a prohibition on competitor copying; he would only need a
prohibition on the copier misattributing the authorship of the work.38
Accepting the discrete public goods model suggests that to the
extent we need copyright at all, we need to turn it on its head. Today,
copyright protects most extensively those iconic works of fiction or
37. As the theory and practice with respect to discrete public goods is still developing, I
leave open the possibility that the per-copy pricing may have helped consumers reach a Nash
equilibrium by establishing a standard against which each consumer could measure their
contribution. Alternatively, knowing the contribution level expected may have led some
consumers to contribute more. For example, some consumers may derive satisfaction from
knowing that they have done more than their share. With a per-copy contribution standard, such
consumers will know how much they should contribute and can therefore contribute more than
that amount in order to experience the extra satisfaction they receive from doing more than their
share. If King simply stated a total contribution amount from all consumers, that satisfaction
from doing more than their share would not be available.
38. But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003)
(holding that section 43(a) of the Trademark Act does not encompass a cause of action for
authorial misattribution). I have explained the doctrinal and policy reasons why section 43(a)
should be read to encompass misattributions with respect to authorship. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
DistinguishingDastar: ConsumerProtection, Mor] Rights, and Section 43(a), in CONSUMER
PROrECTION INTHE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
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entertainment that best match the characteristics of a discrete, rather than
continuous, public good. At the same time, it provides little protection to
factual, useful, or run-of-the-mill fictional works that from the
perspective of end consumers look more like the undifferentiated units of
a single public good-works of authorship-of the continuous public
goods model. Yet, the present emphasis in copyright law is precisely the
opposite of what the economic models of public goods suggest is
desirable. Given that the ordinary workings of the market can ensure the
efficient production of discrete, but not continuous public goods,
copyright should reserve protection, or perhaps protect more extensively,
those works that better match the assumptions of the continuous public
good model. In other words, iconic works should receive little, if any,
protection from copyright. Rather, they should be left to fare on their
own in the marketplace, where the discrete public goods model suggests
that they will be efficiently produced.
B.

IncrementalChange?

In addition to raising questions about the propriety of copyright vel
non, the discrete public goods model suggests, as an intermediate step,
that we should recognize a clear distinction in copyright between
competitor or commercial copying and end user copying. Until the P2P
controversy, copyright seemed to recognize that distinction." In the
United States, although there is no specific exemption for private
copying, for more than two hundred years, no copyright owner
successfully asserted an infringement claim against an individual who
without authorization copied a work for their own personal or private
use." This despite copyright owners' repeated complaints over the last
forty years that private copying was costing them billions in lost sales."'
39. The following paragraphs are taken from the amicus brief I drafted in the Grokster
litigation. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of
Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No.
04-480).
40. Having persuaded the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that P2P users should be branded
copyright infringers in abstentia in the Aimster and Napster litigation, copyright owners have
begun applying the direct infringement rulings of these secondary liability cases to individual P2P
users. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, No. 03 C 6276, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 910 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7,
2005) (granting summary judgment against individual P2P user and awarding $22,500 in
statutory damages against user for downloading thirty music files).
41.
See, e.g., Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Intellectual Property Rights in an
Age of Electronics and Information, OTA-CIT-302, at 101 (Apr. 1986) (citing testimony of Alan
Greenspan presented on behalf of the RIAA that the recording industry lost more than $1.4
billion in revenue in 1982 as a result of home taping); Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong.,
Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422, at 170-71 (Oct.
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Whatever excuses copyright owners may have offered for their
longstanding failure to police what they now claim as their rights, the
fact remains that copying privately, for one's own use, as opposed to
commercially, became an accepted and widespread practice well before
the advent of P2P file sharing.42 In its 1989 report, Copylnght andHome
Copying, for example, the Office of Technology Assessment estimated:
"Americans tape-record individual musical pieces over 1 billion times per
year."' While as much as one-fifth of this taping may have substituted
for authorized purchases, the OTA nevertheless found "an underlying set
of social norms that were supportive of home taping of music."' "There
seemed to be agreement among the public that a person who purchased a
recording had the right to make copies for his own, or a friend's use. The
public did, however, draw the line at using home taping for profit, i.e.
making copies to sell.'"'
Although it did not include a specific private or personal use
exemption in the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress has generally acted
consistently with this well-established social norm. For example, when
Congress extended copyright protection to sound recordings in 1971, the
House Committee report expressly stated Congress's intent to allow
home taping to continue.46 Similarly, when the Court in Sony Corp.
recognized time shifting as a fair use, Congress refused to overrule the
decision.47 And when digital taping technology became available,
1989) [hereinafter OTA, Copyright and Home Copying] (citing similar testimony estimating
losses of $1.5 billion in 1984 for the recording industry as a result of home taping).
42. See OTA, Copyright and Home Copying, supm note 41, at 7, 12 ("In general, both
tapers and nontapers believed that it was acceptable to copy a prerecorded item for one's own use
or to give to a friend. The only copying that was considered universally unacceptable-by tapers
at 139-65.
and nontapers-was copying a tape to sell it."); see also id.
43. Id.at 3,11; see also id at 11.
44. Id at 158, 164.
45. Id.("This survey finding paralleled qualitative findings from focused group
discussions in which tapers and nontapers agreed that taping 'to save money' was acceptable, but
taping 'to make money' was wrong.").
46.
In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings it is the intention
of the Committee that this limited copyright not grant any broader rights than are
accorded to other copyright proprietors under the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not
the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from
tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it. This
practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers
would be in no different position from that of the owners of copyright in recorded
musical compositions over the past 20 years.
H.R. REP.No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572.
47. See Grokster Amicus Brief, supranote 6, at 10.
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Congress formally exempted the practice of privately copying music
from copyright infringement in the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
(AHRA).48 This provision exempted private copying of music in both
analog and digital formats49 and reflected Congress's general intent to

establish the legality of privately copying music both finally and
completely."
In the P2P context, however, courts have refused to follow this
longstanding understanding of copyright law. Instead, they have branded
P2P file sharers copyright infringers en masse. This radical change in the
law came not from Congress or our elective representatives, nor from
judicial proceedings in which these citizens had the right and opportunity

to be heard.

Rather, this change came from judicial proceedings

strategically orchestrated by copyright owners to exclude the relatively
sympathetic P2P users in order to focus judicial ire on the relatively
unsympathetic P2P service providers, such as Napster, Aimster, and

Grokster."' Given the defendants actually before the courts in Napster
48.
Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 2, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), codifiedat17 U.S.C. § 1008
(2006) ("No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright ... based
on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical
recordings or analog musical recordings.").
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 ("No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright ...based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of [a digital audio
recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog
recording medium] for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings."). Lower
courts have held that this exemption does not cover P2P file sharing on the grounds that a
computer is not a digital audio recording device. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 E3d 1004, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001). Yet, if we treat the P2P file sharing software itself as the
relevant device, then it would seem to satisfy the definition of a "digital audio recording device."
17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).
50. See, e.g.,
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 22, 1992),
138 CONG. REc. H9029, 9033 (Statement of Rep. Moorehead) ("Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3204 would
make it clear that noncommercial taping of music by consumers is not a violation of copyright
law. The debate over home taping of records goes back to 1970 when Congress first extended
copyright protection for records but this legislation will end the 22-year-old debate and make it
clear that home taping does not constitute copyright infringement."); id (statement of Rep.
Hughes) ("H.R. 3204 removes the legal cloud over home copying of prerecorded music in the
most proconsumer way possible: It gives consumers a complete exemption for noncommercial
home copying of both digital and analog music, even though the royalty obligations under the bill
apply only to digitally formatted music. No longer will consumers be branded copyright pirates
for making a tape for their car or for their children."); id.at 9035 (statement of Rep. Collins)
("There are three basic provisions of the legislation. First, [the AHRA] guarantees consumers the
legal right to make analog or digital copies of musical recordings for noncommercial use."); id.
at
9036 (statement of Rep. Fish) ("The bill makes clear that the home taping of music is not a
violation of copyright law.").
51.
In the ongoing litigation against digital video recorders, copyright owners
unsuccessfully sought to preclude a group of the alleged direct infringers from using a declaratory
judgment proceeding to join the proceeding. See Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F
Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("The Entertainment Defendants contend that [they] did
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and Aimster,the key issue was the question of secondary liability; the
casual overturning of the longstanding legality of private copying was
little more than an afterthought.52
Consistent with the insights of the discrete public goods model,
Congress should now move to limit end consumer liability for copyright
infringement for the distribution and copying of discrete public goods.
There are three approaches Congress could use. First, Congress could
exempt private copying and distribution from the reach of copyright
altogether. This is the approach most of the rest of the world has adopted
on the issue, formally exempting personal or private use copying from
the scope of their statutes.53 However, as we have discussed, not all works
not even know about the Newmark Plaintiffs until they filed this action, and that they did not
name any individual Doe defendants in the RePlayTVaction and point out that they make these
allegations [of direct infringement] only because these allegations are necessary to state a claim
against RePlayTV for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.").
52. Although the direct infringers were not parties in either the Aimster or Napster
litigation, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, respectively, casually branded all of them as
copyright infringers. See Inre Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 E3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Teenagers and young adults who have access to the Internet like to swap computer files
containing popular music. If the music is copyrighted, such swapping, which involves making
and transmitting a digital copy of the music, infringes copyright"); A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 E3d at 1014 ("Napster users who upload file names to the search index for
others to copy violate plaintiffs' distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing
copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction rights.").
53.
See, e.g.,
Federal Law on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related
Rights, art. 42(1) (1998) (Austria) ("Any person may make single copies of a work for personal
use."); Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, art. 25 (Mar. 22, 2000) (BuIg.) ("The copying of
already published works shall be made without the consent of the author and without
compensation only if it is done for personal use. This shall not be valid for computer software
and architectural designs."); An Act To Amend the Copyright Act, § 80(1) (Apr. 25, 1997) (Can.)
("Subject to subsection (2), the act of reproducing all or any substantial part of [a musical work, a
performance, or a sound recording] onto an audio recording medium for the private use of the
person who makes the copy does not constitute an infringement of the copyright ....
");
Copyright Act of 7/2000, § 30(2)(a)-(c) (July 4, 2000) (Czech Rep.) ("Copyright shall therefore
not be infringed by whoever a) for his own personal use makes a recording, reproduction or
imitation of a work; a reproduction or imitation of a work of fine arts must be clearly labeled as
such ....
");
Act on Copyright, art. 12 (1995) (Den.) ("Anyone is entitled to make, for private
purposes, single copies of works which have been made public'"); Copyright Act, art. 12 (Apr. 25,
1997) (Fin.) ("Any person may make single copies of a disseminated work for his private use.
Such copies may not be used for other purposes."); LAW ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
art. L. 122-5 (Jan. 3, 1995) (Fr.) ("Once a work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit:
...(2) copies or reproductions reserved strictly for the private use of the copier and not intended
for collective use... ); Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, art. 53(1) (July 16, 1998)
(F.R.G.) ("It shall be permissible to make single copies of a work for private use. A person
authorized to make such copies may also cause such copies to be made by another person;
however, this shall apply to the transfer of works to video or audio recording mediums and to the
reproduction of works of fine art only if no payment is received therefor."); Copyright, Related
Rights and Cultural Matters, art. 18(1) (Aug. 2, 1996) (Greece) ("Without prejudice to the
provisions laid down in the following paragraphs, it shall be permissible for a person to make a
reproduction of a lawfully published work for his own private use, without the consent of the
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are discrete public goods, even from the perspective of end consumers.
Such an exemption would be overbroad. Nonetheless, while theoretically
overbroad, it may in practice prove an excellent fit, as consumers, at least
so far, have used P2P networks to share almost exclusively the sorts of
iconic and popular works that match the assumptions of the discrete
public goods model.54
Second, rather than exempt personal or private use copying
altogether, Congress could amend the fair use doctrine to incorporate the
insights of the discrete public goods model. I have argued elsewhere that
courts can use the current fair use doctrine, particularly in the light of the
gloss added by the Court in the Sony betamax decision," to give greater
leeway to private copying.56 Yet, the lower courts have proven decidedly
reluctant to even entertain the possibility. Instead, they have seized on
the Court's statement in Sonythat "[a] challenge to a noncommercial use
of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect
the potential market for the copyrighted work."57 As P2P sharing has
author and without payment."); Copyright Act, § 52(1)(a)(i) (Dec. 30, 1999) (India) ("The
following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely: (a) a fair dealing with a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, not being a computer programme, for the purposes of:
(i) private use, including research"); Copyright Act, 1912, art. 16b (Oct. 27, 1972) (Neth.) ("It
shall not be deemed to be an infringement of the copyright in a literary, scientific or artistic work
to reproduce it in a limited number of copies for the sole purpose of the personal practice, study
or use of the person who makes the copies or orders the copies to be made exclusively for
himself"); Act Relating to Copyright in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, art. 12 (June 2,
1995) (Nor.) ("Provided this is not done for purposes of gain, single copies of a work that has
been issued may be made for private use."); Copyright Law, art. 48 (Apr. 23, 1996) (Peru) ("It
shall be lawful to make copies for exclusively personal use of works, performances or productions
published as sound or audiovisual recordings."); Consolidated Text of the Law on Intellectual
Property, art. 31(1) (Mar. 6, 1998) (Spain) ("Works already disclosed may be reproduced without
authorization from the author and without prejudice, where applicable, to the provisions of Article
34 of this Law in the following cases: ... 2 for the private use of the copier, without prejudice to
the provisions of Articles 25 and 99(a) of this Law, provided that the copy is not put to either
collective or profit-making use."); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, art. 12 (Dec.
7, 1995) (Swed.) ("Anyone is entitled to make, for private purposes, single copies of works which
have been made public."); see also BMG Can., Inc. v. Doe, No. T-292-04, 2004 Fed. Ct. Trial
LEXIS 321, at * 18-19 (Fed. Ct. Can. 2004) ("Thus, downloading a song for personal use does not
amount to infringement.").
54. See Lunney, supranote 21, at 885-86.
55. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984) ("If the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would
presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the
District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be
characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.").
56. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FairUse as Market Failure: Sony Revisited 82 B.U.L. REv.
975 (2002).
57. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451.
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become widespread, lower courts have presumed, despite little empirical
evidence, that widespread unpaid access must somehow adversely affect
the market for the shared works. While an assumption that widespread
unpaid access must equate with lost revenues makes perfect sense for
private goods, which are characterized by rivalrous consumption, it
simply does not hold for public goods, and indeed fundamentally
misunderstands their character. As we have seen in our roommates
hypothetical, unpaid access or free riding is perfectly consistent with, and
does not undermine the incentives necessary for, the efficient production
of discrete public goods.
Third, we could leave private copiers formally liable for their
copying, but eliminate statutory damages for P2P file sharing. This
would leave copyright owners free to pursue claims against individuals
who use P2P networks to engage in file sharing, but would relegate them
to only those damages or lost profits that they could prove resulted from
that individual's actions. While such damages would likely be difficult to
establish, perhaps in large part because they do not exist, this is the rule
we follow in almost every other field of tort and property law. There is
no sensible reason copyright owners should not be held to the same
standard.
Of course, I am perfectly aware that in the current political climate
Congress is not likely to enact any of these reforms. That is unfortunate.
The lawsuits against individual consumers have done little to put the P2P
genie back in its bottle. Instead, they have simply created an unseemly
spectacle where copyright owners enlist the federal judiciary to bash
randomly selected consumers into bankruptcy. Is this really the highest
and best use of the federal judiciary's time?
IV

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While economic theory often trails, rather than leads the
marketplace, the discrete public goods model offers insights on the path
forward for the recording industry. The recording industry should stop
fighting its own consumers and recognize that consumers' own selfinterest will lead them to contribute to the works that they want. Some
consumers will free ride, but, as the discrete public goods model
establishes, free riding is not inconsistent with achieving a fair and
efficient level of incentives for the creation of original works.
Rather than fight P2P, the recording industry should reflect on the
key lesson from the home videotaping controversy. When a new
technological complement comes along that radically reduces
distribution costs for works of authorship, there will be opportunities to
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monetize the resulting increase in the works' value. Formal rights and
insistence on strict control is unnecessary.58 To the extent that end
consumers want the works at issue, what the recording industry should
be looking for are ways to facilitate consumers in reaching the Pareto
efficient Nash equilibrium they are looking for. There will undoubtedly
be missteps and mistakes along this new path. Change is never easy,
particularly when the need for it arises so suddenly. Nonetheless, it is
simply too late to put the P2P genie back in the model, and it is well past
time that the copyright industries began living in the brave new world
that P2P has created.

58. With respect to videotapes and DVDs of movies, copyright owners never obtained an
express right to control videotape and DVD rental, yet they have managed to make money off of
that distribution mechanism nonetheless.

